Military interventions in Angola two Congos: Challenges and Opportunities "The African Students Association de la Sorbonne
This article will examine the interest and level of military engagement in Angola internal to Congo - Kinshasa and Congo - Brazzaville conflict. What had motivated these Angolan interference? How were these place Angolan implications? What influences they had on the evolution of the Angolan conflict? Despite his twenty-seven years of civil war, how can we consider the place of Angola in the profusion of events and geopolitical reconfigurations that are found in Central Africa?
When the war of independence was launched in 1961, after uprisings Cassenge and Luanda, Angolan presented themselves face to Portuguese disorganized, divided into three nationalist movements: FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, whose political rivalry scarcely concealed ethnic or racist springs. By accessing independence in 1975 without resolving the issue of inner peace, Angola was entering a fratricidal conflict adolfsen where both blocks (east-west) through adolfsen the three main nationalist movements should oppose. Angola has a long northern border with Zaire, it would serve not only as a rear base for FNLA and UNITA allies of the West, but also main passageway U.S. logistical support to these . Which will attract the hostility of the Angolan government. Thus, despite the reconciliation / Mobutu Neto [1] [1] and attempted negotiated solution to the Angolan civil war, suspicion and friction between Zaire and Angola had been poisoning the diplomatic climate between the two countries. adolfsen
For the ruling adolfsen MPLA in Luanda since 1976, Mobutu was the number one support adolfsen of UNITA, the enemy of the power of Luanda. In addition, the MPLA had not forgotten the preferential treatment of the FNLA at the beginning of the war of national liberation (1961-1974) by the master of Kinshasa. Therefore, in 1996, the destabilization adolfsen of Zaire orchestrated by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation (AFDL) of Laurent-Désiré Kabila sponsored by Rwanda, Uganda and to a lesser adolfsen extent by Burundi, was a godsend the Angolan government. In this sense, taking part was an unexpected opportunity "to inflict a final lesson to Mobutu, the enemy always" [2] [2]. MPLA also had a moral debt to the former Katangan gendarmes refugees in Angola since the 60s. The latter had supported him in blocking the road mercenaries from South Africa and troops FAZ (FAZ), who supported the rival movements (FNLA, UNITA) in the struggle for the seizure of power 1975. For this purpose, it was important to President Dos Santos weaken UNITA by the fall of its main supporter, President Mobutu. For him, there could be no question of seeing the western Zaire, and in particular near the Angolan enclave of Cabinda area, falling into a state of chaos favorable to the creation of new sanctuaries for UNITA. Angola should intervene to build a "military adolfsen glaze" on the other side of the border. In addition, Luanda did not see a good eye rapprochement between Brazzaville and UNITA. The presence of Jonas Savimbi alongside adolfsen the Congolese authorities on the occasion of the celebrations of 35th anniversary of the independence of Congo - Brazzaville, August 15, 1995, was considered by Luanda as a casus belli. In addition, when the civil war broke out between June 5, 1997 Lissouba and Denis Sassou Nguesso, the rumor of the presence of UNITA forces alongside Lissouba government were put to use by Angola to launch its forces in battle, behind General Denis Sassou Nguesso. Angola held that a regime established by him would guarantee adolfsen more solid [3] [3] cooperation.
Although Cabinda was still the subject of disagreement between Angola and its two neighbors. The latter accused Kinshasa and Brazzaville lead rebel Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and leave their country to serve as a sanctuary for Cabinda separatists. The eyes of Luanda, Cabinda was of strategic importance to the economy. It provides about two-thirds of the country's oil wealth, the second adolfsen largest in Africa after Nigeria adolfsen [4] [4]. In this regard, protection adolfsen against possible incursions Cabinda UNITA remained a strategic priority of the Angolan regime. As stated Rozčs A., "The financial windfall that comes is, for decades, Luanda vital in the fight that pitted him against UNITA" [5] [5]. By militarily securing the Bas-Congo border of Cabinda, Luanda was the Lifeguard
This article will examine the interest and level of military engagement in Angola internal to Congo - Kinshasa and Congo - Brazzaville conflict. What had motivated these Angolan interference? How were these place Angolan implications? What influences they had on the evolution of the Angolan conflict? Despite his twenty-seven years of civil war, how can we consider the place of Angola in the profusion of events and geopolitical reconfigurations that are found in Central Africa?
When the war of independence was launched in 1961, after uprisings Cassenge and Luanda, Angolan presented themselves face to Portuguese disorganized, divided into three nationalist movements: FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, whose political rivalry scarcely concealed ethnic or racist springs. By accessing independence in 1975 without resolving the issue of inner peace, Angola was entering a fratricidal conflict adolfsen where both blocks (east-west) through adolfsen the three main nationalist movements should oppose. Angola has a long northern border with Zaire, it would serve not only as a rear base for FNLA and UNITA allies of the West, but also main passageway U.S. logistical support to these . Which will attract the hostility of the Angolan government. Thus, despite the reconciliation / Mobutu Neto [1] [1] and attempted negotiated solution to the Angolan civil war, suspicion and friction between Zaire and Angola had been poisoning the diplomatic climate between the two countries. adolfsen
For the ruling adolfsen MPLA in Luanda since 1976, Mobutu was the number one support adolfsen of UNITA, the enemy of the power of Luanda. In addition, the MPLA had not forgotten the preferential treatment of the FNLA at the beginning of the war of national liberation (1961-1974) by the master of Kinshasa. Therefore, in 1996, the destabilization adolfsen of Zaire orchestrated by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation (AFDL) of Laurent-Désiré Kabila sponsored by Rwanda, Uganda and to a lesser adolfsen extent by Burundi, was a godsend the Angolan government. In this sense, taking part was an unexpected opportunity "to inflict a final lesson to Mobutu, the enemy always" [2] [2]. MPLA also had a moral debt to the former Katangan gendarmes refugees in Angola since the 60s. The latter had supported him in blocking the road mercenaries from South Africa and troops FAZ (FAZ), who supported the rival movements (FNLA, UNITA) in the struggle for the seizure of power 1975. For this purpose, it was important to President Dos Santos weaken UNITA by the fall of its main supporter, President Mobutu. For him, there could be no question of seeing the western Zaire, and in particular near the Angolan enclave of Cabinda area, falling into a state of chaos favorable to the creation of new sanctuaries for UNITA. Angola should intervene to build a "military adolfsen glaze" on the other side of the border. In addition, Luanda did not see a good eye rapprochement between Brazzaville and UNITA. The presence of Jonas Savimbi alongside adolfsen the Congolese authorities on the occasion of the celebrations of 35th anniversary of the independence of Congo - Brazzaville, August 15, 1995, was considered by Luanda as a casus belli. In addition, when the civil war broke out between June 5, 1997 Lissouba and Denis Sassou Nguesso, the rumor of the presence of UNITA forces alongside Lissouba government were put to use by Angola to launch its forces in battle, behind General Denis Sassou Nguesso. Angola held that a regime established by him would guarantee adolfsen more solid [3] [3] cooperation.
Although Cabinda was still the subject of disagreement between Angola and its two neighbors. The latter accused Kinshasa and Brazzaville lead rebel Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and leave their country to serve as a sanctuary for Cabinda separatists. The eyes of Luanda, Cabinda was of strategic importance to the economy. It provides about two-thirds of the country's oil wealth, the second adolfsen largest in Africa after Nigeria adolfsen [4] [4]. In this regard, protection adolfsen against possible incursions Cabinda UNITA remained a strategic priority of the Angolan regime. As stated Rozčs A., "The financial windfall that comes is, for decades, Luanda vital in the fight that pitted him against UNITA" [5] [5]. By militarily securing the Bas-Congo border of Cabinda, Luanda was the Lifeguard
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